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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to document the puzzling evidence of Norwegian firms, 
both public and private, following a zero leverage policy. We have examined 
accounting data for all Norwegian firms in the period from 1993 to 2010. One of the 
most interesting findings from our study is that 19.1% of all private firms in the whole 
period had zero outstanding debt, which is more than twice as high when compared to 
public companies. Our results show that 29.2% of the private firms also had less than 
5% book l everage, which is almost three times the rate for public firms. We found 
that zero leverage firms are smaller, more profitable, have larger cash balances, pay 
more dividends, have higher ratings, less tangible assets and they pay more taxes 
compared to firms with leverage. Firms are most profitable in the year they become 
zero leveraged, which is also the year they have the largest cash balances (as a ratio of 
total assets). Further on we find that zero leveraged firms differ quite substantially 
among themselves, especially when we compare dividend payers versus non-dividend 
payers. Our results indicate that zero leverage may be a persistent phenomenon, with 
almost 26% of zero leverage firms refraining from debt for at least 8 consecutive 
years. 
 
Keywords: Leverage, low/zero leverage, debt, capital structure, finance, financing.  
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1    Introduction 
In 1958 Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller published a well known, and often 
cited, article called “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of 
Investment”. The model outlined in this article suggested that capital structure is 
irrelevant for the value of a firm in perfect capital markets. However, when they 
include corporate taxes they find that an increase in debt will increase the firm value 
due to the fact that interest payments are tax deductible, and dividends are not.1 This 
article formed the basis for modern thinking on capital structure and has been an 
important inspiration for other famous capital structure theories such as the trade-off 
theory and the pecking order theory. These theories have received different kinds of 
criticism, but perhaps the most important being the observation that firms seem to be 
too conservative in their use of debt. Graham (2000) finds for instance that the typical 
firm could double its tax benefits by issuing more debt.  
 
Although this low leverage puzzle is interesting, recent studies of capital structure 
have shed light on a nother puzzling phenomenon, which we find even more 
interesting.  Strebulaev and Yang (2013) call this phenomenon “the zero-leverage 
puzzle”, and the puzzle is that a high fraction of firms choose to have zero 
outstanding debt. Such extreme debt conservatism cannot be explained by existing 
capital structure theories, and a study of this puzzle is therefore important to get a 
better understanding of financing decisions. Strebulaev and Yang (2013) find that 
between 1962 and 2009, on average 10.2% of large public non-financial US firms had 
zero outstanding debt, and 32% had zero or negative net debt. This is surprisingly 
high. They also find that 61% of firms with zero outstanding debt show no propensity 
to issue debt in the next year.  Because the fraction of zero-leveraged firms is so high, 
they argue that the low-leverage puzzle can be replaced by the zero-leveraged puzzle. 
They back up this claim by showing that if you exclude all firms with a book leverage 
of less than 5% the average book leverage increases from 25% to 32%. Dang (2012) 
did a similar study on UK-firms and found that in the period between 1980 and 2007 
the fraction of zero-levered firms was on average 12.18%.  
 
1 see MM (1958) and MM (1963) 
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Strebulaev and Yang (2013) also argue that studying zero-leverage behaviour can be 
advantageous from an empirical perspective, because the factors that lead firms to 
become low-levered are more likely to be dominating for zero-leverage firms.  
 
1.1    Problems to address 
In this thesis we focus on Norwegian companies and try to replicate parts of the study 
in Strebulaev and Yang (2013) and Dang (2012). To our knowledge, such an analysis 
has never been done on Norwegian companies before. In addition to studying public 
companies, we have extended the study to also include private companies in order to 
see whether there exists a difference between these two groups.  
 
Throughout the thesis we will try to find out if there are significant differences in 
characteristics between levered and zero-levered firms, and we will also try to find 
economic mechanisms that drive companies to become zero-levered.    
 
1.2    Limitations  
One of the most important differences between this thesis and similar studies on zero-
leverage firms is the use of proxies. Strebulaev and Yang (2013) construct a set of 
proxies for each zero-leverage observation, which they find by identifying up to four 
firms that have the same industry code and are the closest to the observed firm in size. 
They have no restriction on leverage, meaning that the proxies may also be firms with 
zero outstanding debt. They then compare characteristics between zero-levered firms 
and their proxies. A big advantage by using such kind of proxies is that they can 
conclude that differences in characteristics are not caused by differences in size or 
industry. Dang’s (2012) study is similar; like Strebulaev and Yang (2013) he creates 
proxy firms, but at the same time he also compares zero-leverage firms with levered 
firms. Constructing these kinds of proxies is a complex process and beyond our 
knowledge. We have therefore chosen to only compare zero-/low- leveraged firms 
with levered firms. As a consequence we cannot make the same conclusions as 
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) and Dang (2012), but we still believe a comparison 
between levered and zero-levered firms can reveal important factors that may lead 
firms to adopt a zero-leverage policy.  
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Another limitation in our thesis is that our dataset does not provide us with market 
information such as market values and share repurchases. Both Strebulaev and Yang 
(2013) and Dang (2012) use the market-to-book ratio to reflect a firm’s growth 
opportunities. Several theories such as Myers (1977) and DeAngelo et al. (2011) say 
that firms with high growth opportunities have less incentive to take on debt. This is 
therefore an interesting measure when comparing levered and unlevered firms.  Share 
repurchases is an important measure to get an overview of a firm’s total payout. 
Information about a firm’s total payout is important to see whether zero-leveraged 
firms retain a higher fraction of their earnings to be able to fund future investments. 
Our dataset only provides us with dividends and we are therefore forced to use this as 
an approximation of total payout.  
 
Finally we see it as a small limitation that there are few publicly listed companies in 
Norway. While Strebulaev and Yang (2013) have on average 4,129 firm observations 
in each year between 1987 and 2009, we have an average of 117 in our period. This 
makes it mo re difficult to find significant differences between leveraged and zero-
leveraged public firms. However, as we will show, the most interesting part of our 
thesis is the study on private firms, and here we have a yearly average of 19,187 firm 
observations.  
 
1.3    Structure 
The thesis is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a presentation of some of the 
most important existing theories on capital structure. This section is meant to give an 
insight into why such a large fraction of firms choose to have zero outstanding debt 
can be called a mystery. Section 3 describes the methodology we have used in parts of 
our analysis, and section 4 explains the data set we have used. In section 5 we present 
the results of our analysis and section 6 concludes. Appendices are found at the end of 
the thesis.   
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2    Capital structure theory 
The relative proportions of a firm’s outstanding securities constitute its capital 
structure. When a firm needs new funds to undertake its investments it has to decide 
which type of security to issue to potential investors, the most common choices of 
financing being debt and equity. Even without the need for new capital a firm might 
still decide to acquire financing and use the raised funds to either repay debt or 
repurchase shares. In this section we present existing capital structure theory, research 
and empirical evidence to outline some of the most important considerations and 
choices firms have to make when deciding a capital structure, e.g. how such choices 
affect the valuation of the firm and its profitability. This section will then serve as a 
theoretical background in understanding why the decision to have zero leverage is in 
fact a mystery. 
 
2.1    Capital structure irrelevance: Modigliani-Miller 
Modigliani and Miller (from now: MM) (1958) argued that capital structure was 
irrelevant and would not affect a firm’s value under a set of conditions referred to as 
perfect capital markets: 1) There are no t axes, transaction costs, issuance costs or 
arbitrage opportunities. 2) Commodities which can be regarded as perfect substitutes 
must sell at the same price in equilibrium. 3) The financing decisions of a firm do not 
change the underlying cash flows of its investments, nor do t hey reveal new 
information about them.  
 
Under these conditions MM (1958) set forth a couple of propositions regarding firm 
value and the cost of capital.  
 
2.1.1    Modigliani-Miller I 
MM Proposition I: “The market value of any firm is independent of its capital 
structure and is given by capitalizing its expected return at the rate pk appropriate to 
its class.” (Modigliani and Miller, 1958 p. 8) 
 
MM (1958) assumed that firms could be divided into equivalent return classes, 
denoted by k. The expected rate of return for each class is then denoted by pk. Further 
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on, MM (1958) argued that the total cash flow generated by a firm’s assets should 
equal the total cash flow paid out to the security holders of the firm. By the law of one 
price, the firm’s outstanding securities and its assets must have the same market 
value. As the issuance of any type of security in a p erfect capital market does not 
change the underlying cash flows of a firm’s assets, the capital structure of the firm is 
irrelevant.  
 
Should investors, for some reason, prefer a different capital structure than the firm, 
MM (1958) showed that they could create their own capital structure by borrowing or 
lending money on their own. This is called homemade leverage. Under the condition 
that the investors can borrow and lend money at the same interest rates as the firm, 
homemade leverage will act as a perfect substitute for any capital structure of the 
firm.  
 
2.1.2    Modigliani-Miller II 
MM Proposition II: “The expected yield of a share of stock is equal to the 
appropriate capitalization rate pk for a pure equity stream in the class, plus a 
premium related to financial risk equal to the debt-equity ratio times the spread 
between pk and r.” (Modigliani and Miller, 1958 p. 11) 
 
MM (1958) proposition II states that an all equity firm has an expected return, ij, 
equal to pk, while a leveraged firm has an expected return equal to pk, plus pk minus 
the cost of debt, r, times that firm’s debt to equity ratio, Dj/Sj. As the proposition 
holds for realized returns it also holds for expected return. 
 
𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝𝑘 + (𝑝𝑘 − 𝑟)𝐷𝑗/𝑆𝑗  
 
(1) 
With proposition I MM (1958) showed that the value of a firm does not depend upon 
its choice of capital structure, rather it comes from the underlying cash flows of the 
firm’s assets and the firm’s cost of capital. The cost of debt and the cost of equity 
often differ quite a bit, the cost of debt usually being lowest. One might therefore 
think that increasing a firm’s leverage ratio would lower the cost of capital and 
increase the value of the firm. MM (1958) proved that this is not the case, as adding 
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more debt (Dj) will increase the risk and therefore the cost the firm’s equity (ij). They 
showed that the savings gained from the lower cost of debt will be perfectly offset by 
the increased cost of equity, and subsequently the firm’s weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) will stay unchanged.  
 
2.2    The effect of the interest tax shield: Modigliani-Miller 
MM’s propositions (I and II) provide useful insights into the world of corporate 
finance, however there is no such thing as a perfect capital market. Two market 
imperfections that are essential for firms are corporate taxes and the tax deductibility 
of interest payments. Combined, these two imperfections play a large role in 
determining the capital structure of firms.   
 
Firms have to pay taxes on t heir earnings, but only after interest payments are 
deducted. This interest tax deduction will lower the amount of taxes the firm has to 
pay, assuming the firm has positive earnings, and thus there exists an incentive to use 
debt. Although interest payments will reduce the amount of cash available to the 
equity holders of the firm, the total amount of cash the firm can pay out to all its 
investors, the free cash flow to the firm (FCFF), will be higher due to the interest tax 
shield. A consequence of the firm’s ability to pay out more cash to its investors is that 
it will have increased its value. This increase in value exactly matches the gain arising 
from the interest tax shield, which can be calculated each year as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (2) 
 
The cash flow from a firm with leverage is equal to the cash flow from a firm without 
leverage plus the interest tax shield. By the law of one price the same must be true for 
the present values of these cash flows. In the presence of taxes MM (1958, 1963) 
showed that the value of a l evered firm, VL, would exceed the value of the firm 
without leverage, VU, due to the present value of the tax savings from debt, PV(TS). 
 
𝑉𝐿 = 𝑉𝑈 + 𝑃𝑉(𝑇𝑆) (3) 
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Figure 1: The WACC with and without corporate taxes 
Figure 1 shows the weighted average cost of capital with and without taxes. The equity cost of capital 
increases with leverage, so does the debt cost of capital, but it does so at a lower rate.  Without taxes 
the WACC is constant for all debt levels, and it equals the debt cost of capital when the firm is 100% 
debt financed. Taxes lower the debt cost of capital due to the interest tax shield, subsequently the 
WACC declines with increasing leverage. Source: (Berk and DeMarzo, 2011).   
 
Equations (1) and (3) have become the building block of capital structure theory in 
most modern Corporate Finance Textbooks. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of leverage 
and corporate taxes on a firm's overall cost of capital. When computing the increase 
in a firm’s value due to the interest tax shield one needs to make assumptions about 
future debt levels. As the debt policies of many companies often change these 
computations vary in their reliability. In order to simplify matters let us consider the 
case of a f irm with permanent debt operating in a world with a constant marginal 
corporate tax rate. If we also assume that the debt is fairly priced, the value of the 
interest tax shield simply becomes the corporate tax rate times the market value of 
debt. With a corporate tax rate of 30% a firm which takes on $10 0m in new 
permanent debt will have increased its value by $30m. 
 
Another way to look at the benefit of leverage is to calculate its effect on the firm’s 
weighted average cost of capital. Since interest payments are tax deductible debt will 
in reality have a lower cost than the explicit rate at which the firm can borrow money. 
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This insight implies that an increase in the debt ratio of a firm will lower a firm’s 
WACC. Consequently future cash flows will have a higher present value, which will 
match the present value of the interest tax shield.  
 
2.3    Trade-off theory 
As shown in the section above, Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) model created a 
benefit for debt when corporate income tax was included. Since the model assumes 
that there are no costs associated with a change in leverage it suggests extreme debt 
levels. Such extreme debt levels are not observed in the real world and the model 
therefore needs to include some sort of offsetting cost of debt to be more realistic. 
Several different authors have presented theories that include different forms of such 
costs. The term trade-off theory has been used to describe these theories. They all 
have in common that the costs and benefits of alternative financing methods are 
evaluated by a decision maker who runs the firm. The optimal solution is found where 
the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits.  
 
In this paper we divide the trade-off theories into two main categories; Static- and 
Dynamic trade-off theory. The former category consists of single period trade-off 
theories that do not recognize the role of time and assume that a firm’s leverage is 
determined by a t rade-off between tax benefits and costs of bankruptcy. Dynamic 
trade-off theory also considers such a trade-off. However, at the same time, it 
recognises adjustment costs associated with refinancing and fluctuations in asset 
values over time.  
 
2.3.1    Static Trade-off Theory 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) provide a classic trade-off model where corporate 
taxes and bankruptcy costs are put into a single-period valuation model in a complete 
capital market. Their intuition is that for a certain level of leverage, the bankruptcy 
costs will equal the advantage of decreased taxes, and the value of the company is 
therefore maximised at this level. A simple mathematical explanation of their model 
is presented in equation (4).  
 
𝑉𝐿 = 𝑉𝑈 + 𝑃𝑉(𝑇𝑆) − 𝑃𝑉(𝐵𝐶) (4) 
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Figure 2: Optimal leverage with taxes and bankruptcy costs 
Figure 2 shows that for a certain level of leverage (D*) for each firm the gains from increasing debt are 
completely offset by the increase in bankruptcy costs. This is the level of leverage that maximises the 
company value. It also shows that the company with high bankruptcy costs (distress costs) has a lower 
optimal level of leverage than the company with low bankruptcy costs. Source: (Berk and DeMarzo, 
2011).   
 
Equation (4) states that the total value of a l everaged company (VL) is given by the 
value of the company if it has no leverage (VU) plus the present value of the interest 
tax shield (PV(TS)) minus the present value of bankruptcy costs (PV(BC)). An 
increase in leverage is associated with an increase in the tax shield, which increases 
the firm value, but such an increase also leads to an increase in bankruptcy costs, 
which again lowers the firm value. The firm value is maximised when the marginal 
benefits of the tax shield equals the marginal cost of bankruptcy.  
 
To calculate a precise value of the bankruptcy costs is complicated and this has been 
done in different ways by different authors. Weiss (1990) classifies the bankruptcy 
costs as either direct or indirect bankruptcy costs, where direct costs are related to the  
 
costs of an actual bankruptcy, while indirect costs are costs that arise before a possible 
bankruptcy. Examples of the latter are loss of competiveness, poor credit terms or 
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broken contracts, while direct bankruptcy costs can be legal- and audit expenses or 
cost of liquidating assets (because they are often sold at fire sale prices).   
 
Since companies face different tax rates and levels of bankruptcy costs, this theory 
implies that each company has a distinctive optimal level of leverage. Figure 2 shows 
different optimal levels of leverage for three firms with different levels of bankruptcy 
costs. Logically, a firm with high bankruptcy costs has a lower optimal level of 
leverage than a firm with low bankruptcy costs.   
 
2.3.2    Dynamic Trade-off models 
In contrast to static trade-off models, dynamic models recognise the role of time. 
Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) were the first to develop a d ynamic trade-off 
model that recognises that a firm’s optimal structural choices are dependent on 
transaction costs and the fluctuations in asset values over time. In their model firms 
still consider a trade-off between tax benefits and bankruptcy. However, because there 
are transaction costs associated with a recapitalisation, firms will refinance only 
occasionally. In other words, a firm will not refinance until the benefit of the 
refinancing outweighs the cost. This implies that there is not one distinctive optimal 
leverage ratio, but an optimal range. As long as a firm’s leverage stays within this 
range, it has no incentive to recapitalise. The size of this range is dependent on the 
variables included in the model. They argue that a decrease in the corporate tax rate or 
bankruptcy costs will widen the range. The same counts for an increase in the 
variance of asset values.  
 
Strebulaev (2007) provides a similar model as the one in Fischer, Heinkel and 
Zechner (1989). An important aspect with this model is that it highlights the 
difficulties in interpreting the relationship between leverage and profitability; an 
aspect in which empirical studies have found the trade-off model to fail. As 
previously shown, an increase in a firm’s profitability will in the trade-off model 
reduce the expected bankruptcy costs and therefore gives the firm the opportunity to 
increase its tax benefits by increasing leverage. The model therefore states that the 
leverage-profitability relationship should be positive. However, empirical studies such 
as Myers (1993) have found this relation to be negative. This observed negative 
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relation has been perhaps the most important criticism raised against the trade-off 
model.  
 
The model in Strebulaev (2007) shows that economy dynamics can explain the 
negative relationship. His model suggests that expected profitability and leverage is 
positively correlated at a refinance point. This is consistent with the traditional trade-
off models, but the model also suggests that in a dynamic economy the relationship is 
negative. The intuition behind this is that when firms do not refinance, an increase in 
profitability will increase the future profitability and therefore also the value of the 
firms. This results in a lower market and book leverage, ceteris paribus. In the 
simulations of the model, there are firms that refinance in any period, but the firms 
that do not  do s o dominate. Consequently the model shows a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage.  
 
2.4    Agency cost theories 
Agency cost theory defines corporate managers as agents for shareholders and 
analyses the conflicting interest between them. This conflict exists because 
shareholders want the company to be run in a way that maximises their value, but 
management has incentives to maximise their personal power and wealth. This may 
not be in the best interests of the shareholders. Since they cannot control all the 
decisions made by the managers there exists informational asymmetries between 
them, and this can lead to agency costs. 
 
Jensen (1986) points out that the conflicting interest between the shareholders and 
management are particularly severe when the company has a substantial amount of 
free cash flow. This is mainly because there is a greater possibility that the 
management will, for personal reasons, invest some of this free cash flow in projects 
that generate returns below the company’s cost of capital. The idea behind the agency 
cost theory is that shareholders can constrain management by increasing the company 
leverage, and thereby decrease the amount of free cash flow. However, under the 
section “The Role of Debt in Motivating Organizational Efficiency” Jensen (1986) 
also points out that an increase in leverage will not always have a positive control 
effect. For instance fast growing companies with many high profitable investment 
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opportunities, but with a low amount of free cash flow, will commonly need to turn to 
the financial markets to obtain capital. For each capital raise, the markets have the 
option to evaluate the proposed projects and the company management. As long as 
this option is used in an efficient manner the gains of increasing leverage for control 
purposes is petite.  
 
2.5    Pecking order theory 
Pecking order theory suggests that there exists asymmetric information between the 
managers of a firm and the stockholders, and that both parties are aware of this. 
Myers and Majulf (1984) argue that as long as this asymmetric information exists, 
managers will prefer internal- to external financing.  T he logic being that this 
condition will lead to an under-pricing of the firm’s equity because managers will 
always have incentives to issue new equity when the stock is overpriced. However, as 
long as external investors are aware of this, an equity issue sends a strong pessimistic 
signal to the market. The managers will also try to avoid an equity issue if the stock is 
under-priced, and if this happens at the same time as the firm has an investment 
opportunity managers might disregard the investment even if it has a positive NPV. 
This is called “the underinvestment problem”.  
 
Myers and Majulf (1984) go on by defining a rating of the different financing options 
where the idea is that managers will chose the best-rated option first. More precise; 
the managers will choose internal financing (financial slack) first, then debt. Hybrid 
securities (as convertible bonds) are the third option, and finally issue of new equity.  
 
The pecking order theory therefore violates the other theories presented earlier as 
managers are not trying to achieve a cer tain level of leverage, but rather issue debt 
and equity when financing is required. In other words, according to this theory, if a 
firm has enough cash to undertake all of its possible investments (with a positive 
NPV) the managers of the firm will not issue any debt or new equity. 
 
2.6    Dynamic Financing and Investment Models 
Although traditional capital structure theory suggests that the optimal debt ratio is the 
one that maximizes the value of a firm, evidence has shown that firms typically hold 
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debt levels below this optimal point. Dynamic financing and investment models 
(starting with Hennessy and Whited, 2005) combine elements of both trade-off and 
pecking order theories and generally produce more "realistic" leverage ratios. 
 
According to DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Whited (2011) optimal leverage targets 
include the option to issue transitory debt, thus allowing firms to handle (unexpected) 
investment needs, referred to as investment shocks. To fund such shocks firms often, 
deliberately – but temporarily – deviate from their leverage targets by issuing 
transitory debt.  
 
Transitory debt refers to the difference between actual and target debt levels, and is 
not necessarily all of a firm’s short term debt; it is simply debt that managers intend to 
pay off in the short to intermediate term to free up de bt capacity. Rather than the 
duration of the debt, it is managerial intent that defines whether or not the debt is 
transitory.  
 
In DeAngelo et al.’s (2011) dynamic capital structure model the target capital 
structure of firms and their use of transitory debt is directly related to the nature of 
their investment opportunities because “(i) borrowing is a c ost-efficient means of 
raising capital when a gi ven shock to investment opportunities dictates a f unding 
need, and (ii) the option to issue debt is a scarce resource whose optimal 
intertemporal utilization depends on bot h current and pr ospective shocks.” 
(DeAngelo et al. 2011, p. 1). The option to issue debt is valuable since the model, in 
contrast to extant trade-off models, assumes that investment decisions are 
endogenous, and that all forms of financing are costly. Other dynamic capital 
structure studies also state the importance of endogenous investment, see for example 
Tserlukevich (2008), Morreles and Schürnoff (2010), and Sundaresan and Wang 
(2006), who study the leverage impact of real options. The assumption of endogenous 
investment policy is critical to the model, with variation in investment opportunity 
attributes being the main driver behind the models predictions.  
 
The takeaway here is that debt capacity is a finite – and limited – resource, while at 
the same time being the cheapest form of external financing for a firm (where 
cheapest is defined as involving the lowest financing costs). It therefore stands to 
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reason that firms would prefer to issue debt to fund investment shocks. As a result 
they would have to keep their debt levels below target, and retain the option to issue 
debt.  
 
If a firm issues debt today it also must include the opportunity cost of its consequent 
future inability to borrow when calculating the relevant leverage-related cost. This 
opportunity cost implies that target capital structures are even more conservative. A 
firm’s long run target debt level, when viewed ex ante, is then the level that optimally 
balances the tax shield from debt, distress costs of debt and the opportunity cost of 
using debt capacity now.  
 
Further on, the model shows that the amount of outstanding debt of firms is inversely 
related to the volatility of unexpected investment shocks, meaning that firms who 
experience unpredicted investment needs tend to have less debt. While, on the other 
hand, firms that have more predictable future investment needs, or lower volatility of 
investment shocks, tend to have more debt outstanding.  The conclusion being that the 
higher the degree of investment shock volatility the more valuable it is  for firms to 
preserve debt capacity. On average, the benefit of preserving debt capacity outweighs 
the negative impact of the loss of the interest tax shield due to lower debt ratios. 
DeAngelo et al. (2011) also show that firms who face high investment shock volatility 
rely more on ( tax disadvantaged) cash balances to fund investment, as unused debt 
capacity might not suffice, thus reducing their net debt even further. In such cases 
maintaining cash balances is the preferable option compared to costlier equity 
financing.  
 
2.7    Empirical evidence and research 
In this section we will outline literature that reviews how the traditional capital 
structure theories hold up empirically. We will also give an insight on research into 
the zero-leverage mystery. 
 
2.7.1    The trade-off model 
As previously mentioned, the static trade-off model, building on the results of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), suggests that firms choose their capital structure to 
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balance the costs and benefits of debt financing. In their review of empirical capital 
structure studies Graham and Leary (2011) find that “...several cross-sectional 
patterns in leverage are broadly consistent with this view.” (Graham and Leary, 2011 
p. 9). 
 
According to the trade-off model, within-firm deviations from leverage targets are 
costly and should be corrected. Jalilvand and Harris (1984) present evidence of 
within-firm mean-reversion of leverage ratios, which is consistent with the trade-off 
view. However, Graham and Leary (2011) find important shortcomings in empirical 
studies of the trade-off model. According to the model more profitable firms, ceteris 
paribus, should value the tax-shield benefits of debt higher. Nonetheless, many 
authors point out that there is a negative relation between leverage and profitability, 
which goes against the view of the trade-off model.  
 
Further, Graham and Leary (2011) point out that many firms have low leverage 
despite facing low distress risk and heavy tax burdens. Other studies, e.g. Fama and 
French (2002) and Iliev and Welch (2010), suggest that the observed speed of 
adjustment towards leverage target is too slow to be consistent with the static trade-
off model. According to Myers (1993) the aforementioned model may be a weak 
guide to average firm behaviour, and he states that it doesn’t help much in 
understanding the decisions of any given firm. 
  
2.7.2    Pecking order 
The pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) is a traditional alternative to the 
trade-off theories. Like the trade-off model it discusses the costs and benefits of 
capital structure decisions (all capital structure theory does), but the theories differ 
with regards to which market frictions are most important.  
 
Graham and Leary (2011) state that the promise of the pecking order theory lies 
within its consistency with two main empirical findings: “(i) there is a significant 
negative market reaction to the announcement of seasoned equity issues; and (ii) in 
aggregate, firms fund the majority of investments with retained earnings while 
aggregate net equity issues often are small or even negative.” (Graham and Leary 
2011, p. 11).  
23 
 
 In support of the pecking order theory, studies by Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) 
and Helwege and Liang (1996) have shown a strong correlation between the 
retirement/issuance of debt and a firm’s need for external financing. A study by Frank 
and Goyal (2003) has provided different results, they show that smaller and younger 
firms prefer equity issues when they are in need external financing. Fama and French 
(2005) report similar results, they find that small and high growth firms prefer equity 
issues over debt.  
 
In support of the pecking order Lemmon and Zender (2010) point out that small firms 
may be constrained by limited debt capacity, and therefore the findings of Fama and 
French (2005) may not be inconsistent with the traditional theory.  
 
A study by Leary and Roberts (2010) finds that the pecking order struggles to predict 
capital structure decisions, over a r ange of subsamples. While Myers (2001) finds, 
overall, that the pecking order might be a useful conditional theory. However it still 
leaves many financing decisions unexplained. 
 
2.7.3    The low/zero leverage mystery 
Although some of the models we have mentioned might explain why some firms have 
low leverage, or at least lower leverage than "target", none of them are able to explain 
why such a large portion of firms take their capital structure decisions to the extreme 
and choose almost zero, or zero, leverage.  
 
In a recent empirical study, Strebulaev and Yang (2013) document the puzzling 
evidence that a large fraction of U.S. publicly traded firms follow a zero leverage 
policy. They find that, on average, over the period from 1962 to 2009 10.2% of these 
firms have zero debt, and almost 22% have less than a 5% book l everage ratio. 
Further on t hey find that as firms become less and less leveraged they effectively 
replace interest costs with dividend payments, thus keeping the total payout of firms 
relatively stable across the leverage spectrum.  
 
A decision by a firm to have zero leverage is also not a short term deviation from 
target leverage. The evidence suggests that it is a persistent phenomenon. 61% of 
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firms with no d ebt, in any given year, show no inclination of acquiring debt the 
following year, and as much as 30% of zero leverage firms follow such a policy for at 
least 5 consecutive years.  
 
To understand the nature of zero leverage behaviour better Strebulaev and Yang 
(2013) construct a set of proxy firms, chosen by industry and size, for each zero 
leverage firm-year observation. These proxy firms then serve as control observations. 
The evidence shows that ZL firms and their proxies differ significantly along a 
number of dimensions: on average ZL firms are more profitable, pay more dividends, 
pay more income taxes, have less tangible assets, have higher cash balances, and they 
are smaller. 
 
They also find that ZL firms give up a substantial amount of tax benefits of debt, on 
average they leave 7.6% of their market values on the table by choosing not to lever 
up. This only reinforces the mystery of why some firms chose such an extreme debt 
policy.  
 
According to their study, neither industry nor size can explain this puzzling 
phenomenon. However, they find that family owned firms and firms with higher CEO 
ownership and longer CEO tenure are more likely to adopt a ZL policy. Their results 
suggest “that managerial and gov ernance characteristics are related to the zero-
leverage phenomenon in an important way.” (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013, pp 2) 
 
In a similar study, concentrating on UK firms, Dang (2012) finds comparable results. 
Over a sample period between 1980 and 2007 he finds that 12.18% of publicly listed, 
non-financial, firms in the UK have zero outstanding debt, which is even higher than 
Strebulaev and Yang (2013). In the period between 2000 a nd 2007 a lmost 20% of 
such firms followed a zero leverage policy.  
 
He finds that ZL firms are smaller and younger, that they have less tangible assets, 
pay higher dividends and have larger cash holdings, compared to their proxy firms. 
Also firms with higher growth opportunities are more likely to become zero 
leveraged. In contrast to Strebulaev and Yang (2013) he finds that ZL firms are less 
profitable then their proxies. The evidence also shows that ZL firms with less cash 
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holdings and growth opportunities, but more capital expenditures, are more likely to 
become leveraged.  
 
Even though ZL firms differ from their proxy firms and from leveraged firms among 
many dimensions, both studies, Strebulaev and Yang (2013) and Dang (2012), agree 
that zero leverage behaviour remains a mystery. A model which can fully explain this 
phenomenon remains to be found.  
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3    Methodology 
This section will be used to discuss the methodology used in parts of the upcoming 
analysis. Since there has been little empirical research earlier on the theme of this 
thesis a l arge part of the analysis will be descriptive data, which has a fairly 
straightforward methodology. This type of analysis will not be discussed in this 
section. 
 
3.1    T-Test   
In one part of the analysis we present a comparison between zero leveraged- and 
leveraged firms across different dimensions. To get a better understanding of the 
difference between the two samples, for each reported variable, we first perform an F-
test to check for either equal or unequal variances. Then we perform an independent 
two sample pairwise T-test, for either equal or unequal variances, both samples with 
unequal sample sizes. The T-test shows whether there is a s ignificant difference 
between the average values of the two categories (i.e. zero leveraged and leveraged) 
for the variable in interest.  
 
3.2    Binary logistic regression 
We are interested in exploring the properties of zero-leveraged (ZL) firms and we will 
therefore run a r egression with ZL as the dependent variable. Since ZL is a b inary 
variable (i.e. can only take on two possible values) a standard linear regression model 
will in this case have certain shortcomings. The two most important being that the 
coefficient’s marginal partial effects are constant and that the predicted probabilities 
can take on v alues that are not within the range of zero to one. Instead, we will 
therefore use a binary response model (hereafter referred to as “logit-model”), which 
is shown in equation (5).  (Wooldridge, 2009) 
 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯+  𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 
𝐺(∙) = 𝐺(𝑧) = 𝑒𝑧1 + 𝑒𝑧 
(5) 
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This model estimates the probability (P) of the dependent binary variable (y) to have 
an outcome of 1, given the explanatory variables (x1-xk). The explanatory variables 
have coefficients (β1 – βk) and G(z) is a function which ensures that the predicted 
probabilities are always between zero and one for all real numbers z.  
 
Aldrich and Nelson (1984) discuss two important assumptions, in addition to what is 
already mentioned, that need to be fulfilled for the logit-regression to be valid. The 
first one being that the observations of the explanatory variables need to be 
independent from each other. Since we are using panel data, observations for each 
firm in different years are highly correlated. This violates the mentioned assumption. 
To adjust for this we run the regression with standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. The second assumption is that there cannot be a strong linear connection 
between two or more of the explanatory variables. We have therefore carefully chosen 
explanatory variables that are not expected to have this kind of relationship. The 
pairwise correlations between the selected variables are presented in Appendix 5. The 
level of correlation is similar to other studies on the same theme, as for instance Dang 
(2011).  
 
A weakness with the logit-model is that the coefficients are not as easily interpreted 
as in a standard linear regression. Whereas the coefficients in a linear regression will 
show how much a one unit increase in the independent variable will change the 
outcome of the dependent variable, the interpretation of coefficients in the logit-
model are a little more defuse. Since the function G is non-linear, the marginal partial 
effects of the coefficients are not constant. Consequently, if the value of one 
independent variable is changed, or another one is included, the coefficients and the 
marginal partial effects of all the other variables will change as well.   
 
Wooldridge (2009) suggests mainly two different methods for presenting the 
independent variables’ effect on the dependent variable; the partial effect of the 
average (PEA) and average partial effect (APE).  
 
The PEA method replaces the independent variables with their average and then 
reports the marginal effects of the average observation in the sample. Unfortunately, 
this method does not work well if some of the dependent variables included in the 
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regression are discrete- or dummy variables. If for instance a dummy variable 
recognises whether a company is listed on a  public exchange and 35% of the 
companies in the sample are listed it would not make any sense to use a value of .35 
for the average company, as this is an impossible value to obtain.  
 
To get around this problem it is possible to use the APE method instead. In this 
method a coefficient represents the average marginal effect for all the values of the 
corresponding explanatory variable in the sample. We will use this method when we 
present our results in the coming analysis.  
 
3.3    The models 
Since the coefficients for each explanatory variable of the binary logistic regression 
are dependent on the level of the other explanatory variables included in the model we 
run two different regressions, both with standard errors clustered at firm level. The 
models are shown in equation (6) and (7).  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝑍𝐿) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛼2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ +
𝛼4𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛼5𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑍𝐿 + 𝜀  (6) 
  
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝑍𝐿) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ +
𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑍𝐿 + 𝛽7𝑅&𝐷 +
𝛽8𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 𝑎𝑏𝑠 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑.𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐 𝑍𝐿 + 𝜀     
(7) 
 
All the variables used in the two models are explained in Appendix 1.  
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4    The Data Source 
We use accounting data for all Norwegian companies, both public and private, for the 
years 1993 – 2010. The data set is divided into single company accounts and 
consolidated group accounts for all years. The data set is made available by SNF 
(Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration) and NHH 
(Norwegian School of Economics) through Aksel Mjøs and Karoline Øksnes.  
 
All Norwegian companies owning subsidiaries, with ownership being above 50%, 
have to file both company accounts and consolidated accounts. This results in 
partially overlapping data sets. We merged the data sets and excluded single company 
filings for parent companies, using only their consolidated accounts. We have also 
excluded subsidiaries, as we assume that any major decision regarding debt and 
capital structure is made by the parent company. The indication of subsidiary status is 
only given for the years 2005 – 2010, and thus these years will be most accurate since 
subsidiary companies will be included in the years before 2005. We have divided the 
total sample into three categories: 1) private firms (including private consolidated 
groups), 2) private consolidated groups and 3) public firms (listed on the Oslo stock 
exchange). 
 
In line with most capital structure research, this paper focuses on the debt structure of 
mostly non-financial private and public companies. We have therefore excluded the 
following industries, which are mainly financial companies, according to the 
classification of NACE: 65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension 
funding; 66 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security; 75 
Public administration and defence & compulsory social security; 91 A ctivities of 
business, employers and professional organizations; 95 A ctivities of households as 
employers of domestic staff. After this exclusion we are still left with a group of some 
financial firms; even so, we believe we have excluded the most problematic, when 
viewed in the light of capital structure research. 
 
The data source includes all Norwegian companies, including sole proprietorships and 
single person holding companies. We believe that many of these small firms may not 
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be representative for the data sample as a whole as their borrowing capacity is tied to 
the personal wealth of the entrepreneur. We therefore exclude all observations (firm-
years) with either total revenues or total assets below NOK 5 million. Any firm-years 
with missing values for total revenue or total assets have also been excluded, as we 
will be using these variables in most of our study. Since we are only interested in 
domestic Norwegian firms we have also excluded any non-Norwegian firms.  
 
We are then left with a data set with varying degrees of firm-year observations for 
each of our three categories: 1) private firms – 345,363 observations, 2) private 
consolidated groups – 63,124 observations and 3) public firms – 2,112 observations. 
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5    Analysis 
In this section we will report the results of our analyses. Many of the following 
subsections are similar to Strebulaev and Yang (2013), i.e. the reporting of fractions 
of various categories of low-leveraged firms, descriptive statistics, persistence studies 
and logit regressions. Nonetheless our analyses still differ in many regards, for 
instance we examine exclusively Norwegian firms. Whereas Strebulaev and Yang 
(2013) only analyse publicly listed firms, we analyse both public and private firms. 
We have also performed an event study focusing on the evolution of firms in the years 
prior and posterior to the year in which they become zero leveraged.  
 
5.1    Leverage definitions 
As previously explained, our dataset has been divided into three sub-categories; 
public companies, private companies and private consolidated groups. For all three 
categories we report the fraction of zero leveraged (ZL) firms. In line with Strebulaev 
and Yang (2013), we have classified firms with zero or low leverage into four partly 
overlapping categories. A firm is defined as a ZL firm in any given year if its amount 
of interest bearing debt equals zero in that year.  
 
As Strebulaev and Yang (2013), we compute the fraction of firms with zero long-term 
debt for the sake of comparison. A firm is defined as a ZLTD firm in a given year if 
that firm has zero long term debt outstanding. A difference in the fraction of ZL and 
ZLTD will then indicate that some ZLTD firms carry some form of short-term debt. 
The fraction of firms with zero long term debt will then almost always be higher than 
that of zero leveraged firms.  
 
If a firm in any given year has a book leverage of less than five percent it is classified 
as an almost zero leverage (AZL) firm. Strebulaev and Yang (2013) point out several 
reasons for why it might be interesting to look at AZL firms as well, the main reason 
being that the existing theoretical models on capital structure suggest leverage ratios 
that are well above zero: 
 
“From a t heoretical standpoint, a num ber of models (e.g., Fisher, Heinkel, and 
Zechner (1989), Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Leland (1998), Goldstein, Ju, 
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and Leland (2001), Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005)) produce leverage 
ratios that are well above zero. Cross-sectional dynamics modelled by Strebulaev 
(2007) may produce ﬁrms that are almost zero-leverage but in his benchmark case 
their fraction is very low. Practically, the ﬁnance nature of various liabilities 
assigned by accounting conventions to debt is ambiguous (for example, advances to 
ﬁnance construction or instalment obligations)” (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013, p. 6) 
 
And lastly, like Strebulaev and Yang (2013) we calculate the fraction of firms with 
non-positive net debt (NPND). If a firm’s book value of interest bearing debt minus 
cash is less than zero, in any given year, we define it as an NPND firm. Cash can in 
some circumstances be viewed as negative debt, at least if one receives the same 
interest rate on ones cash holdings as one pays on ones outstanding debt. If this is the 
case, some portion, or all, of the tax benefits received from debt may be negated by 
taxes paid due to cash holdings. 
 
5.2    Fraction of zero/almost zero leveraged firms 
We divide section 5.2 i nto three parts; starting with public companies, then private 
consolidated groups, and lastly private companies. The reason we do t his is to 
compare the three different samples and to see if there are any major differences 
between public and private firms. 
 
5.2.1    Public companies 
The fraction of public ZL firms relative to the total size of the sample are reported in 
respectively column 1 and 2 in table 1 for each year between 1993 and 2010.  
 
We find that, on average, 7.4% of the total firm-years follow a ZL policy, but there is 
a considerable variation across years with a minimum of 0% in 1993 and a maximum 
of 12% in 2004. The average fraction of ZLTD is 10.3%, which indicates that almost 
30% of these firms carry liabilities classified as short-term debt in our dataset.  
 
Column 3 of table 1 shows an average fraction of AZL firms as high as 19.3%. As a 
comparison the dynamic model by Strebulaev (2007) suggests that less than 1% of  
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Table 1 
Fraction of ZL/AZL firms – Public companies 
The table shows the fraction of ZL and AZL firms and also the fraction of ZLTD and NPND firms for 
public companies. ZL firms are firms with zero outstanding interest bearing debt. AZL firms are firms 
with book leverage below 5%. ZLTD firms have zero long term interest bearing debt and NPND firms 
are firms with non-positive net debt (i.e. have more cash than interest bearing debt).   
Year ZL ZLTD AZL NPND N 
1993 0.0 0.0 3.5 15.8 67 
1994 0.0 1.3 6.5 15.6 77 
1995 2.4 2.4 10.6 16.5 85 
1996 5.0 5.9 17.8 28.7 101 
1997 8.0 10.4 20.8 32.8 125 
1998 3.9 5.2 20.1 27.3 154 
1999 5.6 7.0 16.9 28.2 142 
2000 5.4 10.1 19.6 28.4 148 
2001 6.2 10.3 15.8 27.4 146 
2002 9.3 15.0 20.0 26.4 140 
2003 10.7 15.2 25.0 32.1 112 
2004 12.0 14.5 25.6 37.6 117 
2005 10.7 19.4 29.1 48.5 103 
2006 10.9 13.9 20.8 38.6 101 
2007 8.7 11.8 19.7 38.6 127 
2008 7.5 9.0 17.2 30.6 134 
2009 10.8 11.7 20.0 28.3 120 
2010 11.5 15.0 26.5 34.5 113 
Total 7.4 10.3 19.3 30.4 2,112 
 
firms have a book leverage ratio below 5%. In other words, the existing theoretical 
models on capital structure cannot justify this large fraction of AZL firms. 
 
Table 1 shows that 30.4% of the firms in the sample have non-positive net debt on 
average. In light of the trade-off model we find it peculiar that such a large fraction of 
public firms do not seem to care about the tax benefits of debt. 
 
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) report similar statistics for their sample of public firms. 
They find that the average frequency of ZL firms is 10.6%, ZLTD 15.3%, AZL 22.6% 
and NPND 33.1%. Although these fractions are slightly higher than the ones we 
found, they are still within a similar range. Our sample of public firms is also smaller 
than theirs, which may partially account for the difference. 
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Table 2 
Fraction of ZL/AZL firms – Private consolidated groups 
The table shows the fraction of ZL and AZL firms and also the fraction of ZLTD and NPND firms for 
private consolidated groups. ZL firms are firms with zero outstanding interest bearing debt. AZL firms 
are firms with book leverage below 5%. ZLTD firms have zero long term interest bearing debt and 
NPND firms are firms with non-positive net debt (i.e. have more cash than interest bearing debt).   
Year ZL ZLTD AZL NPND N 
1993 5.7 8.9 14.1 28.0 4,189 
1994 6.2 9.4 14.3 28.2 4,401 
1995 7.6 12.3 15.5 28.0 4,762 
1996 8.0 12.3 15.7 28.3 5,157 
1997 8.4 12.9 16.2 28.6 5,885 
1998 8.3 12.7 15.5 27.7 6,297 
1999 7.9 14.2 15.8 28.2 2,785 
2000 7.4 12.5 15.4 25.7 2,744 
2001 7.3 12.1 15.0 25.5 2,825 
2002 7.5 12.2 14.5 26.2 2,751 
2003 8.9 13.3 15.7 27.5 2,661 
2004 8.8 12.7 15.6 28.1 2,601 
2005 8.9 12.6 15.5 27.1 2,557 
2006 8.9 12.9 16.1 28.9 2,402 
2007 9.4 13.5 18.3 31.8 2,646 
2008 8.9 13.4 16.8 29.1 2,783 
2009 9.6 13.5 17.0 30.3 2,854 
2010 9.2 13.7 17.3 30.2 2,824 
Total 8.0 12.3 15.7 28.2 63,124 
 
5.2.2    Private consolidated groups 
Our data sample includes observations for public firms, private firms and private 
consolidated groups. The data sample for private consolidated groups is significantly 
larger than for public companies (63,124 vs. 2,112 firm-year observations), although 
smaller than the sample of all private companies. There are mainly two reasons we 
have performed the same analysis for this category. First, it serves as comparison to 
the study of public firms, as we find it reasonable to assume that the average private 
consolidated group has more similar characteristics to public firms than the average 
private firm has. Second, the sample of private consolidated groups is unbiased with 
regards to subsidiary companies prior to 2005 (as mentioned in section 4).  
 
The same fractions as discussed in the previous section are presented for private 
consolidated groups in table 2.  
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We observe somewhat similar results as for public companies with an average 
fraction of ZL (AZL) firms of 8.0% (15.7%). The average fractions of firms with zero 
long-term debt and non-positive net debt are respectively 12.3% and 28.2%. 
Comparing table 2 to table 1 we see that the difference across years is far less volatile, 
which likely is due to the larger data sample. 
 
5.2.3    Private companies  
Since we have access to a large data sample of private companies (345,363 firm-year 
observations) we want to perform the same analysis for this group, and check whether 
or not there are any differences between public and private firms. To our knowledge 
no other study concerning zero leverage has analysed private firms, which, to us, 
makes this study more interesting than for public companies. Table 3 reports the 
results for private companies. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting finding in our study is that the fraction of private firms 
following a ZL policy is over twice as high compared to both public companies and 
private consolidated groups with an average of 19.1%.  As mentioned earlier, the data 
for private companies between 1993 a nd 2005 m ight be somewhat biased as it 
contains subsidiaries as well as consolidated groups, but this cannot explain these 
extreme values as the average fraction for the data from 2005 t ill 2010 (which are 
corrected for the mentioned bias) are even higher (24.6%).  The difference in AZL 
observations is not as extreme but an average of 26.2% tells us that more than one out 
of four private companies have a book leverage of less than 5% on average. 
 
In addition, when we examine the fraction of NPND firms for the most recent period 
(2005-2010), we find that nearly every second firm (43.3%) had no net debt 
outstanding. This is surprisingly high as it tells us that nearly one out of every two 
firms foregoes the tax benefits of debt, as long as we assume that the interest rate 
received on cash holdings equals the interest rate paid on debt. 
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 Table 3 
Fraction of ZL/AZL firms - Private companies 
The table shows the fraction of ZL and AZL firms and also the fraction of ZLTD and NPND firms for 
private companies. ZL firms are firms with zero outstanding interest bearing debt. AZL firms are firms 
with book leverage below 5%. ZLTD firms have zero long term interest bearing debt and NPND firms 
are firms with non-positive net debt (i.e. have more cash than interest bearing debt).   
Year ZL ZLTD AZL NPND N 
1993 12.5 22.9 21.0 33.5 13,593 
1994 13.2 23.9 21.3 33.8 14,473 
1995 13.6 25.8 21.4 33.1 15,906 
1996 14.5 26.7 22.1 34.0 17,386 
1997 15.0 26.9 23.0 34.8 20,008 
1998 15.0 27.4 23.0 34.7 21,551 
1999 18.0 31.3 25.2 36.0 20,791 
2000 17.4 31.2 24.5 34.7 22,548 
2001 17.9 31.4 25.0 35.6 23,911 
2002 16.8 31.1 24.2 35.5 23,087 
2003 20.4 31.2 26.6 37.6 24,199 
2004 21.1 31.6 27.8 39.2 26,011 
2005 21.8 26.4 27.5 39.5 13,635 
2006 22.5 28.1 28.7 41.2 16,145 
2007 25.3 30.0 32.4 44.8 17,673 
2008 25.7 31.1 32.2 43.8 18,823 
2009 25.7 30.5 32.4 44.8 17,694 
2010 26.5 31.7 33.5 45.7 17,929 
Total 19.1 29.2 26.2 37.8 345,363 
93-04 16.3 28.4 23.8 35.2 243,464 
05-10 24.6 29.6 31.1 43.3 101,899 
 
 
5.3    Descriptive statistics 
With capital structure theory close in mind we find the consistently large fraction of 
zero- and low leverage firms surprising. Moving on, the natural question would be to 
ask if there are any interesting differences between firms with zero leverage (almost 
zero leverage) and firms with leverage (book leverage over 5%). To be more precise 
we have compared firm-years which are ZL and AZL with firm-years that are not 
zero leveraged (NZL) and firm-years which have book leverage above 5% (NAZL).  
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Tables 4, 5 and 6 report a range of descriptive statistics for ZL, AZL, NZL and NAZL 
firm-years. For each variable we have conducted a t-test for equality of means where 
ZL (AZL) firm-years is one sample and NZL (NAZL) firm-years is the other sample.  
 
In section 5.2 we found the most interesting part of our study to be the sample of 
private firms, as this sample had by far the largest portion of zero leveraged 
companies. The sample of public firms is quite small, which often makes it difficult to 
draw clear conclusions. We will, from now, therefore focus primarily on private firms 
and partly private consolidated groups, although we will sometimes still analyse 
public firms. Subsequently, from this section (5.3) we have changed the sequence in 
which we present the results from the different samples. We will start with describing 
private firms (table 4), then private consolidated groups (table 5), and lastly public 
firms (table 6). Definitions of all the variables used can be found in appendix 1.   
 
5.3.1    Private companies 
As expected, table 4 demonstrates that NZL (NAZL) firms have relatively high 
leverage compared to ZL (AZL) firms. For the 1993-2010 period, an NZL firm has an 
average book leverage ratio of 40.6% and a NAZL firm has an average book leverage 
ratio of 44.3%. Both are significantly different from zero by a wide margin; with t-
statistics of 588 and 364.7 respectively. ZL (AZL) and NZL (NAZL) firms also differ 
along a number of other dimensions. They are significantly smaller when comparing 
the natural logarithm of total assets, adjusted for inflation and converted into 1998 
Norwegian Kroner. To get a sense of how much smaller they are we have also tested 
size in absolute terms (NOK million). ZL firms have on a verage total assets of 45 
mNOK compared to 170 mNOK for NZL firms. AZL firms have an average of 95 
mNOK in total assets compared to 164 mNOK for NAZL firms.  ZL (AZL) firms also 
pay higher dividends (as a ratio of total assets), spend less on R&D, pay their CEO’s 
higher salaries (both in absolute terms and as a ratio of total revenue), and pay a 
higher amount of taxes relative to total assets. 
 
ZL (AZL) firms have a significantly lower amount of tangible assets than NZL 
(NAZL) firms, 11.66% (12.69%) versus 34.38% (36.21%). Strebulaev and Yang 
(2013) also show that ZL (AZL) firms have lower tangibility than their proxies, 
although the differences are smaller, 21.3% (23.4%) versus 26.2% (26.7%) 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for ZL and AZL firms (Private companies) 
The table reports descriptive statistics for ZL and AZL firms and NZL and NAZL firms. NZL firms are 
firms with an outstanding interest bearing debt above zero and NAZL firms are firms with book 
leverage above 5%. All variables are defined in Appendix 1 and they show the average value for the 
different groups in the period 1993 to 2010. The T-statistics show whether there is a significant 
difference between the groups.   
 ZL AZL NZL NAZL T-stat T-stat 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) vs. (3) (2) vs. (4) 
Book leverage 0.00 0.56 40.61 44.33 587.99 364.71 
Log (Size) 9.46 9.61 10.04 10.05 101.04 84.60 
Size abs 44.97 95.24 170.21 164.44 7.58 4.69 
Age 15.08 16.11 15.41 15.08 4.48 -14.83 
Profitability 21.59 20.47 12.57 12.09 -73.74 -82.75 
Tangibility 11.66 12.69 34.38 36.21 187.77 221.49 
Cash 35.43 32.53 13.23 12.12 -230.00 -250.00 
Dividend 8.21 7.49 2.28 1.97 -110.00 -120.00 
R&D 0.20 0.25 0.45 0.46 3.45 3.20 
CEO comp 2.32 2.15 1.62 1.61 -57.60 -51.73 
CEO comp abs 415.51 437.43 357.92 344.18 -5.36 -5.91 
Rating 4.12 4.11 3.71 3.67 -56.98 -66.65 
Tax 5.62 5.27 2.04 1.82 -130.00 -150.00 
 
While Strebulaev and Yang (2012) find no significant difference in age, we find that 
ZL firms are on average slightly, but significantly, younger than NZL firms. 
Interestingly, on the other hand, AZL firms are significantly older than NAZL firms.  
 
In light of the pecking order theory one might be tempted to think that firms chose a 
zero/low leverage policy because they may face difficulties in obtaining debt and are 
consequently forced to finance their investments through equity issues. However we 
find these firms to be more profitable than levered firms; in fact they are 1.7 times as 
profitable as NZL and NAZL firms. We therefore find it hard to believe that these 
firms do not have the ability to acquire any level of debt. If we only look at the last 
three years in our sample, the profitability of ZL firms is 21.63% while for NZL firms 
it is 11.40% (unreported).  
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ZL (AZL) firms also have significantly higher credit ratings compared to leveraged 
firms. We use Dun & Bradstreet’s ratings which are somewhat different than the 
ratings of for instance Standard & Poor. There are five different ratings: AAA, AA, 
A, B and C. We have given each rating class a different value, starting with 5 for the 
highest rating (AAA) and descending until 1 for the lowest rating (C). The significant 
difference in ratings further strengthens our belief that a ZL (AZL) policy is a 
conscious decision made by the firms, and not something they have been forced into 
by either internal or external forces.  
 
Similar to Strebulaev and Yang (2013) we also find that ZL and AZL firms pay 
significantly more taxes (as a ratio of total assets), 5.62% and 5.27% respectively, 
than NZL and NAZL firms who correspondingly pay 2.04% and 1.82%. As the 
levered companies pay less tax our results indicate that there exists ample opportunity 
for the zero and low levered firms to take advantage of the tax benefits of debt. 
 
One interesting finding is that ZL (AZL) firms have significantly higher cash balances 
than NZL (NAZL) firms; to be precise their cash balances are on average 2.64 (2.53) 
times as large. It is therefore possible that these firms actually have enough internal 
funds to finance all of their investments. If this were the case then the zero-leverage 
choice could, at least partially, be explained by the pecking order theory. Further, 
DeAngelo et al.’s (2011) dynamic financing theory states that firms that face high 
investment shock volatility are expected to maintain higher cash balances and have 
lower average debt ratios. Unfortunately, we do not have any information on t he 
different firms’ investment opportunities or capital expenditure, which could help us 
back up these claims.  
 
5.3.2    Private consolidated groups 
When we take a closer look at private consolidated groups (table 5) we find results 
which are quite similar to those of private companies. ZL/AZL firms are still smaller 
(not significantly when looking at absolute size differences between AZL and 
NAZL), more profitable, have a lower degree of tangibility, have higher cash 
balances, pay higher dividends, pay their CEO’s more, have higher credit ratings and 
pay more taxes. Most of the t-statistics are lower, although still significant. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics for ZL and AZL firms (Consolidated groups) 
The table reports descriptive statistics for ZL and AZL firms and NZL and NAZL firms. NZL firms are 
firms with an outstanding interest bearing debt above zero and NAZL firms are firms with book 
leverage above 5%. All variables are defined in Appendix 1 and they show the average value for the 
different groups in the period 1993 to 2010. The T-statistics show whether there is a significant 
difference between the groups.   
 ZL AZL NZL NAZL T-stat T-stat 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) vs. (3) (2) vs. (4) 
Book leverage 0.00 1.02 39.06 42.41 289.12 128.97 
Log (Size) 10.51 10.82 11.21 11.21 30.24 22.67 
Size abs 150.44 427.04 515.41 497.04 5.50 1.41 
Age 18.61 19.99 18.24 17.95 -1.23 -8.43 
Profitability 16.18 15.06 11.17 10.93 -9.39 -13.10 
Tangibility 15.24 16.23 37.42 39.25 58.17 82.55 
Cash 32.93 28.73 12.44 11.36 -69.66 -84.70 
Dividend 2.10 1.77 0.63 0.56 -11.41 -12.52 
R&D 0.52 0.86 0.53 0.47 0.06 -1.63 
CEO comp 0.97 0.78 0.51 0.50 -11.31 -11.03 
CEO comp abs 368.75 370.53 305.78 299.61 -4.77 -7.25 
Rating 4.02 4.01 3.73 3.70 -12.67 -17.91 
Tax 4.53 4.06 1.80 1.63 -36.40 -47.40 
 
The main differences are that R&D is no longer statistically different between ZL 
(AZL) firms and NZL (NAZL) firms, neither is the difference in age between ZL and 
NZL. 
 
5.3.3    Public companies 
The descriptive statistics for public companies (table 6) show many similarities with 
tables 4 and 5, but also a number of differences, some of which are quite interesting. 
Compared to NZL (NAZL) firms ZL (AZL) firms are still smaller, have larger cash 
balances, lower tangibility, larger CEO compensation ratio, higher credit ratings and 
pay more taxes. Now both ZL (14.55) and AZL firms (21.87) are significantly 
younger than NZL (32.91) and NAZL firms (33.86).  
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Table 6 
Descriptive statistics for ZL and AZL firms (Public companies) 
The table reports descriptive statistics for ZL and AZL firms and NZL and NAZL firms. NZL firms are 
firms with an outstanding interest bearing debt above zero and NAZL firms are firms with book 
leverage above 5%. All variables are defined in Appendix 1 and they show the average value for the 
different groups in the period 1993 to 2010. The T-statistics show whether there is a s ignificant 
difference between the groups.   
 ZL AZL NZL NAZL T-stat T-stat 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) vs. (3) (2) vs. (4) 
Book leverage 0.00 1.27 30.12 34.23 60.54 32.27 
Log (Size) 12.44 12.91 14.04 14.16 10.70 12.74 
Size abs 493.33 3,185.67 9,639.68 10,300.00 2.83 3.34 
Age 14.55 21.87 32.91 33.86 6.31 6.20 
Profitability -0.01 2.89 6.39 6.64 2.28 2.48 
Tangibility 9.97 10.79 34.66 37.85 10.72 18.78 
Cash 37.82 28.67 12.06 10.46 -13.39 -16.49 
Dividend 0.16 0.30 0.18 0.15 0.14 -1.24 
R&D 22.19 17.33 5.89 4.69 -1.04 -1.70 
CEO comp 1.91 0.84 0.34 0.34 -2.29 -2.21 
CEO comp abs 1,208.79 1,261.61 1,334.25 1,341.18 0.54 0.57 
Rating 4.01 3.98 3.79 3.76 -2.42 -3.21 
Tax 2.69 2.08 1.05 0.96 -3.31 -4.07 
 
The differences in dividend are not significant, neither is R&D, for all ZL and AZL 
firms. Perhaps the most interesting finding for public ZL (AZL) firms is that they are 
significantly less profitable than public NZL (NAZL) firms. Actually the profitability 
of public ZL firms is insignificantly different from zero. This might indicate that the 
adoption of a ZL policy may be linked to low profitability for public firms, which 
would certainly be an interesting topic for further study. 
 
5.3.4    Dividend and interest expense – Private companies 
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) point out that a possible explanation of the zero-leverage 
puzzle is that ZL and AZL firms are mainly high-growth firms and consequently 
prefer a lower book-leverage. Dang (2012) also argues that a p art of the ZL firms 
might be zero leveraged as a consequence of financial constraints and therefore do not 
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have the ability to take on debt. In line with their studies we have therefore divided 
both ZL and NZL firms into dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms and 
compared the same characteristics, as in the sections above, of these sub-samples. 
Their intuition for distinguishing between these sub-samples is that high growth firms 
and constrained firms are more likely to retain all or almost all of their earnings to be 
able to use them for future investments and to reduce the probability of having to 
finance their investments externally. 
 
As our findings in section 5.3.1 suggest that ZL firms pay higher dividends, on 
average, it is  not likely that this study will explain the whole zero leverage puzzle. 
However, Dang (2012) argues that ZL firms may not be homogenous. A comparison 
between dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms can therefore be important as 
it is likely that the group of constrained firms consists of firms that are small, young 
and high-growth firms that are expected to have a more conservative debt policy (i.e. 
Myers (1977)). On the other hand, the financial choices made by the less constrained 
groups might be explained by other financial theories, as for instance the dynamic 
financing theory. The results of the study are presented in Table 7.    
 
Both groups of ZL firms (dividend and non dividend paying) still have the same 
characteristic differences as in section 5.3.1 when compared with their respective 
class of leveraged firms. The interesting observation is how ZL firms differ among 
themselves. 
 
While Strebulaev and Yang (2013) and Dang (2012) find that ZL firms that do not  
pay dividends have typical characteristics of constrained- and high growth firms, we 
cannot make this conclusion in our study. They find these firms to be less profitable, 
smaller and younger than ZL firms who pay dividends. Our findings suggest that they 
on average are actually larger (68.14 vs. 21.51 m NOK) and have no s ignificant 
difference in age. Their profitability is significantly lower in our study, although still 
quite high (15.20% vs. 28.06%).  
 
ZL firms who pay dividends have larger cash balances than ZL firms who do not pay 
dividend, 38.39% vs. 32.50% respectively, and they pay substantially more taxes (8% 
vs. 3.27%). This finding is inconsistent with the traditional trade-off theory as the 
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Table 7 
ZL firms with/without Dividend Payments vs. Levered firms with/without dividend 
payments (Private companies) 
The table reports descriptive statistics for dividend paying- and non-dividend paying ZL firms and also 
dividend paying- and non-dividend paying NZL firms. All variables are defined in Appendix 1 and 
they show the average value for the different groups in the period 1993 to 2010. The T-statistics show 
whether there is a significant difference between the groups.   
  ZL ZL NZL NZL       
 w Div w/o Div w Div w/o Div T-stat T-stat T-stat 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) vs. (2) (1) vs. (3) (2) vs. (4) 
Book leverage 0.00 0.00 26.87 45.63 - 366.03 519.51 
Log (Size) 9.27 9.64 9.67 10.18 47.37 57.10 63.71 
Size abs 21.51 68.14 10.01 195.91 9.90 6.52 4.87 
Age 14.98 15.18 17.20 14.75 1.58 20.89 -4.09 
Profitability 28.06 15.20 20.21 9.77 -58.22 -64.73 -26.57 
Tangibility 11.17 12.15 30.44 35.82 7.45 126.83 134.11 
Cash 38.39 32.50 17.52 11.67 -32.06 -150.00 -150.00 
Dividend 16.53 0.00 8.53 0.00 - -84.25 - 
R&D 0.04 0.35 0.04 0.59 6.91 0.01 2.13 
CEO comp 2.36 2.28 1.79 1.46 -3.61 -33.46 -39.88 
CEO comp abs 405.63 425.99 350.38 360.85 6.27 -22.25 -3.60 
Rating 4.21 4.05 4.15 3.57 -13.94 -6.67 -47.98 
Tax 8.00 3.27 4.42 1.16 -93.74 -96.73 -54.73 
No. of obs.  32,789 33,207 74,853 204,514    
 
dividend paying ZL firms choose to pay out funds to their equity holders rather than 
issue debt and increase their tax benefits.  
 
Consistent with Strebulaev and Yang (2013) we find that dividend-paying ZL firms 
pay out larger dividends relative to book assets than NZL firms who pay dividends. In 
fact, they pay out almost twice as much (16.53% vs. 8.53%). Following their study we 
have therefore chosen to decompose the total payout of these firms. If ZL or AZL 
firms are in fact high growth firms it would be reasonable to believe that they retain a 
higher fraction of their earnings so as to be able to finance future investments.  
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) define total payout as in equation (8). 
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 Figure 3: Dividend and interest expense – dividend paying private firms 
The figure shows dividend paying private firm’s average dividend and interest expense across the 
leverage spectrum for the period 1993-2010. The total payout is defined as the sum of dividend and 
interest expense. 
 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 =  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 + 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  (8) 
 
Unfortunately our dataset does not provide us with a good approximation of stock 
repurchases. Consequently we leave out stock repurchases in our definition of total 
payout. Figure 3 shows the result of the decomposition.  
 
We find dividends to be decreasing with leverage and interest expense to be 
increasing with leverage. This is consistent with Strebulaev and Yang (2013). 
However, while they find the total payout to be relatively stable across the leverage 
spectrum, we actually observe the total payout to be decreasing. This means that 
dividend paying ZL firms, which are almost half of all ZL firms in our sample, have 
on average a higher total payout than leveraged firms. As mentioned, we have no 
information on share repurchases in our study, but as Strebulaev and Yang (2013) 
find share repurchases to be decreasing with leverage it is reasonable to believe that 
02
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such an inclusion would make the slope of the total payout even steeper. This is an 
interesting finding because it indicates that dividend paying ZL and AZL firms do not 
choose lower debt levels in order to be able to retain a higher fraction of their 
earnings. In other words, it seems that dynamic financing models cannot explain the 
zero leverage puzzle for these firms, as they would explain zero leverage as a 
consequence of a company’s wish to retain a higher proportion of its earnings to be 
able to finance future investments.  
 
5.4    Industry 
To get a better understanding of zero-leverage behaviour it might be interesting to 
take a closer look at differences between the industries the companies operate in. Our 
dataset provides NACE classifications for all the firm-year observations, which makes 
it possible for us to do so. In addition to general NACE classifications the data is also 
sorted into 12 main industries. We have decided to use this main classification in our 
industry study, which is presented in table 9. For a better understanding of which 
NACE classifications are included in the 12 different industries, please see Appendix 
2. 
 
Table 8 reports the distribution of ZL and AZL firms in addition to the average book 
leverage (BL) and the average firm size (in mNOK) of each industry. Table 9 shows a 
considerable variation in the distribution of ZL/AZL firms between the industries, 
which can indicate that industry specific factors might explain parts of the zero 
leverage puzzle. The ZL (AZL) distribution ranges from 9.2% (12.9%) in Primary 
industries to 45.9% (60.4%) in Financial services. IT/Telecom and Culture/Media 
have the second and third highest distribution of ZL firms. Strebulaev and Yang 
(2013) point out that reputation, human capital and asset illiquidity considerations 
might be influential in the explanation of ZL behaviour in these industries.  
 
Given that the average firm size in the financial services sector is as high as 1,224 
mNOK, the second largest of the 12 industries, we found it somewhat surprising that 
this industry had by far the highest proportion of ZL firms, particularly since our 
previous findings show that ZL firms are significantly smaller than leveraged firms. 
We therefore examined the different firms within this industry, and found that only a  
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Table 8 
Industry breakdown - Private firms 
The table reports the average fraction of ZL and AZL firms in 12 main industries as defined in 
Appendix 2 in addition to the industry average size and book leverage (BL).   
Industry BL Size ZL AZL N 
Primary industry 0.49 56 9.2 12.9 12,123 
Manufacturing 0.32 102 13.5 20.4 54,036 
Oil/gas 0.37 3162 17.7 26.4 1,441 
Construction/energy 0.21 146 22.6 33.2 35,620 
Commerce 0.29 44 20.4 27.3 105,917 
Transport/Travel 0.35 102 18.0 24.2 15,785 
Shipping 0.53 459 11.1 14.7 8,934 
Financial services 0.15 1224 45.9 60.4 882 
Services/advisory/real estate 0.40 138 19.2 25.4 78,374 
Healthcare 0.34 94 22.9 28.2 7,635 
Culture/Media 0.33 59 25.5 33.0 5,138 
IT/Telecom 0.21 176 39.0 49.2 7,924 
All - - 19.1 26.1 333,809 
 
few, extensively large, firms drove up the average size.  In fact, if we leave out the 
largest firm the average firm size drops to 371 mNOK (unreported). So the high 
average firm size in the remaining financial firms is mainly due to large outliers. 
 
Even though there is a large variation in ZL/AZL distribution between the different 
industries the number of firms following this policy is substantial in each industry, 
proving that zero leverage behaviour cannot be explained by industry alone.   
 
Conducting the same study for public companies and private consolidated groups 
gives us similar results: For all three sub-categories, Financial services, IT/Telecom 
and Culture/Media are the three industries with the highest fraction of ZL companies. 
Primary industry is also the industry with the lowest fraction of ZL and AZL firms. 
Zero leverage behaviour is also an industry-wide persistent phenomenon as it is 
present in all industries. The results of the industry-studies for public companies and 
private consolidated groups are presented in Appendix 3. 
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5.5    Zero Leverage Event Study – Private companies 
From tables 1, 2  and 3 we know that a considerable fraction of Norwegian firms, 
especially private firms, are zero leveraged. In this section we study what happens in 
and around the time in which a firm becomes zero leveraged. We will point out any 
defining changes, and how some important indicator ratios evolve when a firm goes 
from being NZL to ZL. The subsequent analysis follows Eckbo and Kisser (2013) and 
conducts an event study for all private firms. 
 
We conduct our analysis by first we identifying all firms which have at least one year 
in which they are zero leveraged. Then, for each firm, we define the first year in 
which it becomes zero leveraged, which is our event year zero. Event year (from now: 
year) -5 is then the state of an average firm 5 years before it became zero leveraged, 
and subsequently year 5 is the state of the average firm 5 years after it first became 
zero leveraged. The event period in our figure stretches from year -7 to year 10 with a 
minimum of observations close to 2,000 in any given year and a maximum close to 
23,000 in year 0. T his gives us a total of 18 years, and 121,341 f irm-year 
observations. 
 
We include 4 variables in our event study, namely profitability, book leverage, cash 
and book assets. The first three are defined in Appendix 1. We also thought it would 
be interesting to include a variable that measures the relative proportion of a firm’s 
total assets in any given year to the firm’s total assets in year 0, adjusted for inflation. 
We have called this variable ‘book assets’. In other words: for each firm j we divide 
inflation-adjusted total assets in year t by inflation-adjusted total assets in year 0, then 
we summarize and divide by the number of observations in year t. Equation (9) sums 
up this procedure. 
  
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 = 1𝐽𝑡�𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 𝐶𝑃𝐼98 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑗,𝑡⁄𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,0 𝐶𝑃𝐼98 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑗,0⁄𝐽𝑗=1  (9) 
 
 
Figure 4 depicts our results, and Appendix 4 provides the results numerically. 
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 Figure 4: Zero leverage event study 
Average ratio evolution around the first year a firm becomes zero leveraged (event year 0), 1993-2010. 
The x-axis is the event year, the left axis is linked to the first four variables (profitability, book 
leverage, tangibility and cash) and the right axis is linked to the variable book assets. 
 
If we compare figure 4 to table 4 we see that the average firm in year -7 is quite close 
to the average NZL firm for our entire sample. Profitability in year -7 is 14.1% 
compared to 12.6% for the average NZL firm. Book leverage is 40% compared to 
40.6%, cash is 16.1% compared to 13.2% and tangibility is 29.52% in year -7 while it 
is 34.38% for NZL firms. The interesting takeaway here, with regards to these four 
variables, is that it is next to impossible to identify which firms will become zero 
leveraged 7 years (or more) ahead of such an event. We also see that the average firm 
is almost 1.5 times as large in year -7 compared to year 0 with regards to book assets.  
 
Moving closer towards year -1, we see a steady decline in book leverage, book assets 
and tangibility. This indicates that the average firm in this study disposes of fixed 
assets to be able to pay down its interest bearing debt. However, it is also possible that 
the reduction in tangibility and book assets are caused by depreciation and lower asset 
investments than usual. Either way, it seems as if firms in the years prior to year 0 
0.0
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have a higher focus on reducing their debt levels rather than investing in new, or 
improving existing, assets. 
 
Both profitability and cash as a ratio of total assets are rising steadily. The reduction 
in assets then corresponds to an increasing marginal profitability, which may be 
explained by the fact that when reducing their book assets firms would be expected to 
sell off their least profitable assets first.  
 
What happens in year 0 is the most interesting part of the study. Book leverage, 
naturally, drops to zero and book assets is at its lowest point for the whole sample. 
This is in line with our earlier results, which showed that ZL firms are smaller than 
NZL firms. Why they choose to hold such large balances of cash is quite interesting. 
In year 0 the cash to total assets ratio spikes to 33.5%. A possible reason, viewed in 
the light of the dynamic financing model of DeAngelo et al. (2011), is that they wish 
to retain a larger degree of financial flexibility for the forthcoming years. However, 
we already know from the dividend study in section 5.3.4 that this is not the case for 
the average dividend paying ZL firm.  
  
We also see a large spike in profitability in year 0, from 17.5%, in year -1, to 25.8%. 
As year 0 is the year in which firms have the lowest level of book assets, these results 
indicate that they have scaled down their operations to their most profitable segments, 
which might help explain the reason why ZL firms are more profitable than NZL 
firms for our entire data sample (see table 5).  
 
Moving forward from year 0 the trend for all five variables has changed. Book 
leverage, book assets and tangibility start climbing, while profitability and cash start 
declining. Around year 7 profitability, book l everage, cash and tangibility seem to 
stabilise in the region of 15%, 13%, 28% and 16% respectively. What is interesting is 
that book assets continues to climb, while the other variables remain somewhat stable, 
perhaps indicating some form of post zero leverage-event steady state, although far 
from certain. Given enough time and a larger data set spanning more years this would 
definitely be an interesting topic for further study.  
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Perhaps one of the most interesting results of this event study is that profitability ends 
up close to, approximately 15%, its pre-event stability of around 14% in year -7, 
while being at elevated levels in the years between. In year -7 there are of course no 
ZL firms, while in year 7, 48.53% of the firms have zero leverage (unreported). It 
would then seem that the profitability effect of zero leverage is a passing 
phenomenon, which would also be an interesting topic for further study.  
 
5.6    ZL and AZL persistence 
When studying zero-leverage behaviour an interesting factor is the duration of the 
firms’ zero-leverage policy. It might be possible that firms stay zero leveraged for 
only a short period of time due to an imbalance between maturing debt and new debt 
issuance. If so, the zero leverage puzzle would not be that puzzling (Strebulaev & 
Yang, 2013). In this section we therefore try to analyse the persistence of zero 
leverage behaviour.  
 
We analyse ZL persistence by looking at n = 3,335 private companies and n = 248 
consolidated groups. For each firm j we start by identifying the first year they adopt a 
zero-leverage policy (k = 0) and study their zero-leverage behaviour for the next 
seven years. If firm j has continuously followed a ZL policy from year k = 0 to k it 
will be recorded as persistent (ZLPj,k = 1) in year k and if not ZLPj,k will be zero. The 
calculation of the persistence is shown mathematically in equation (10). We have also 
analysed the AZL persistence. The only difference from the ZL persistence measure is 
AZLPj,k which equals 1 i f firm j continuously follows an AZL policy (i.e. book 
leverage < 5 %) from year k = 0 to k and zero otherwise. The measure of AZL 
persistence is shown in equation (11)   
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑍𝐿𝑘 =  1𝑛  �𝑍𝐿𝑃𝑗,𝑘𝐽
𝑗=1
 
 
(10) 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑍𝐿𝑘 =  1𝑛  �𝐴𝑍𝐿𝑃𝑗,𝑘𝐽
𝑗=1
 (11) 
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Table 9 
    
 
  
 
ZL/AZL persistence 
 The table reports the persistence of ZL and AZL policies. The persistence measure is defined in section 
5.6 and shows for each year, k, the fraction of companies that are still ZL firms, and has been since 
year k = 0.  
 Private companies  Private consolidated groups 
k PerZLk PerAZLk  PerZLk PerAZLk 
0 100.0 100.0 
 
100.0 100.0 
1 70.8 72.6 
 
69.0 69.2 
2 55.2 58.1 
 
52.4 58.1 
3 45.2 48.7 
 
40.3 47.0 
4 38.8 41.8 
 
31.5 38.3 
5 33.4 36.7 
 
25.0 31.2 
6 29.0 31.9 
 
21.4 25.5 
7 25.8 28.4 
 
18.5 20.9 
Obs. (n)  3,355 4,798  248 494 
 
The firms included in this persistence study are selected because only they fulfil our 
criteria of a recording of a zero-leverage policy and a recording for each of the seven 
consecutive years in our dataset. Table 9 shows the results of our analysis. 
 
Our results show that approximately 70% and 55% of the private firms in this study 
continue a ZL policy for at least one and two years respectively, and as much as 
25.8% of the firms continuously have zero leverage for at least 7 years after they first 
become zero levered. These numbers indicate that zero leverage may in fact be a 
(sufficiently) persistent phenomenon, which leads us to believe that they might not 
simply be the result of an imbalance between maturing debt and new debt issuance.  
 
Table 9 also reports the persistence of private consolidated groups. We can see that 
zero-leverage is persistent in this group as well, although the fraction of surviving 
ZL/AZL firms is declining somewhat faster when compared to private firms. Even so, 
in year k = 7, the fraction of surviving ZL (18.5%) and AZL (20.9%) firms is still 
relatively high. 
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5.7    Logistic Regression Analysis 
Table 10 contains the results of our logistic regression analysis. The reported 
coefficients are the average partial effect of each variable, with standard errors in 
parentheses. The number of stars reports the level of significance; three being 
significant at the 1% level, two at 5%, one at 10% and no s tars insignificance. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable for ZL, which takes the value of 1 if a firm-
year observation has zero outstanding debt and 0 ot herwise. For each of our three 
samples we have two subsamples, the first ones including six independent variables: 
size, profitability, cash, age, tangibility and initial ZL. In the second subsamples we 
have added three more variables: R&D, CEO compensation and industry fraction of 
ZL.  
 
Overall the results show that the regressions are statistically significant, with pseudo 
R-squared ranging from 0.377 to 0.512. The coefficient on firm size is significantly 
negative in models 1-5, with values ranging from -0.005 to -0.015. In model 6 the size 
coefficient is insignificantly negative; this may be due to the smaller sample size of 
this model. These results strongly indicate that a firm is more likely to adopt a ZL 
policy when it is smaller, which is in line with our descriptive statistics (see table 4 – 
6).  
 
Profitability is significantly positive at the 1% level for models 1-3, at the 5% level 
for model 4, and positive, but not significant, for models 5 and 6. So the more 
profitable a firm is the more likely it is  to be zero leveraged, at least for private 
companies and private consolidated groups. To explore this relationship further we 
have also looked at the interaction between profitability and size. For private 
companies we conducted a f ixed effects linear regression with profitability as the 
dependent variable and log (size) as an independent variable. We conducted the same 
regression for private consolidated groups, but with random effects instead of fixed2. 
Both regressions revealed a significant negative relationship between size and 
profitability with coefficients for both sub-samples around -0,01 (unreported). This 
means that the difference in profitability between ZL and NZL firms for private firms 
and private consolidated groups might be a consequence of this negative relationship  
2 The choice between fixed and random effects was done by running a Hausman test 
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Table 10 
Logit Regression. Determinants of Zero-leveraged Policy 
The table reports the results of logit regressions on the sample over the years 1993-2010. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if a firm-year observation has an outstanding 
interest bearing debt of zero. The partial effect of the average and standard errors (in parentheses) are 
presented. *, ** and *** indicate that the differences are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  All the variables are defined in Appendix 1.     
  Private companies Private groups Public companies 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log (Size) -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.011** -0.015 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) 
Profitability 0.095*** 0.105*** 0.037*** 0.046** 0.004 0.070 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021) (0.057) 
Cash 0.264*** 0.312*** 0.187*** 0.206*** 0.212*** 0.244*** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.022) (0.026) (0.060) 
Age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangibility -0.207*** -0.245*** -0.131*** -0.199 -0.077 0.098* 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.026) (0.049) (0.056) 
Initial ZL 0.235*** 0.231*** 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.109*** 0.140*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.013) (0.020) 
R&D 
 
-0.053* 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.321 
  
(0.029) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.388) 
Ceo comp abs 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Ind. frac. ZL  0.217*** 
 
0.127*** 
 
0.273*** 
    (0.015)   (0.042)   (0.082) 
Observations 341,847 215,903 62,979 7,715 2,112 465 
Pseudo R-squared 0.416 0.389 0.400 0.377 0.425 0.512 
 
rather than the difference in leverage, since we have found ZL firms to be 
significantly smaller than NZL firms.   
 
Cash has a statistically significant positive effect on a firm’s probability of being zero 
leveraged, with coefficients ranging from 0.187 to 0.312, all of which are significant 
54 
 
at the 1% level. Regarding age, all the coefficients are marginally positive and 
statistically significant (except for model 5). Cash is the independent variable with 
coefficients of the largest magnitude, meaning that the marginal effect of cash is 
larger than any of the other variables. The larger the cash holdings of a firm the larger 
the probability of that firm being a ZL firm, which is consistent with our earlier 
results in tables 4, 5 and 6.  
 
The age coefficients, on the other hand, are of the smallest magnitude, but they are 
still significant, and positive, for all models except models 5 and 6. The age 
coefficients in models 1-4 are in line with our earlier results. The older a private firm 
is the more likely it is to be zero leveraged, although the effect is very small. As we 
can see from tables 4, 5 and 6, the age gap between ZL and NZL firms is existent, but 
minor.  
 
Tangibility is significantly negative at the 1% level for models 1-3, significantly 
positive at the 10% level for model 6, and insignificantly negative for models 4 and 5. 
The coefficient values for the models range from -0.245 (model 2) to 0.098 (model 6). 
So a firm with fewer tangible assets is more likely to be a ZL firm, except in model 6.  
 
The coefficients for the variable initial ZL (if a firm is a ZL firm in its first firm-year 
observation) are all significantly positive, and of a large magnitude, at the 1% level 
for all six models. A firm which is zero leveraged the first time it is reported in our 
dataset is then more likely to be zero leveraged in subsequent years, which supports 
our findings from our persistence study. 
 
As previously mentioned, we added three more variables in models 2, 4 and 6, namely 
R&D, CEO compensation and industry fraction of ZL. As we can see from table 10 
R&D is negative in all models, but insignificant in models 4 and 6, and only 
significant at the 10% level in model 2. This is consistent with our descriptive study, 
where we found that ZL firms spend less on R&D than NZL firms.  
 
The coefficients for CEO compensation are not significant for any of the models, and 
they are also of a very low magnitude.  
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Lastly, the coefficients of the variable for industry fraction of ZL are significantly 
positive at the 1% level for all three models, and they are of a large scale. A firm is 
then more likely to be zero leveraged if the fraction of firms within its NACE-coded 
industry is high.  
 
All in all comparing the results from our logistic regression with our descriptive study 
in section 5.3, we find that they support each other nicely, and we can largely draw 
similar conclusions from both.  
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6    Concluding remarks 
In this thesis we have documented the puzzling fact of Norwegian firms’ propensity 
to have zero outstanding debt. Using publicly available accounting data over the 
period 1993-2010, collected and provided by SNF (Institute for Research in 
Economics and Business Administration), we have analysed all Norwegian firms, 
both public and private.  
 
To our knowledge there are few similar studies regarding Norwegian firms, and little 
theoretical and empirical research into the fact that firms choose to have zero 
outstanding debt despite the existence of the tax deductibility of interest payments. 
We therefore hope that this paper can help shed light on the zero leveraged mystery, 
and perhaps inspire others to expand and continue our chosen research path.  
 
We begin our analysis by studying both private and public firms. Then we choose to 
focus primarily on private firms. There are two main reasons behind this choice. First, 
there are few publicly listed companies in Norway, which makes the sample size 
small, while on the other hand our sample size of private firms is extensive. Second, 
zero leverage is a more prevalent phenomenon for private firms, and thus the results 
from our analysis of this sample are, to us (and hopefully the reader), of greater 
interest. 
 
We find that 19.1% of all private firms have zero outstanding debt over the whole 
period, which is twice the rate of public firms, and 29.2% have less than 5% book 
leverage, thrice the rate of public firms. Compared with leveraged firms, zero 
leveraged firms are smaller, more profitable, have larger cash balances, pay more 
dividends, have higher credit ratings, more tangible assets and they pay more taxes.  
 
In the years leading up to the year in which firms become zero leveraged they show 
increasing profitability and cash holdings, and decreasing total assets and book 
leverage. The trends are reversed in the years following the zero leverage event-year. 
Firms are at their most profitable (by a large margin), have largest cash holdings and 
the smallest amount of total assets in the year they become zero leveraged. 
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We find that zero leveraged firms can be divided into two main categories, namely 
dividend payers and non-dividend payers. ZL firms who pay dividends are smaller, 
more profitable, have larger cash holding and pay more taxes than ZL firms who do 
not pay dividends. Further, our analysis suggests that zero leverage policy may be 
persistent, with almost 26% of zero leveraged firms refraining from debt for at least 
eight consecutive years.  
 
Further studies into the zero leverage mystery would certainly be interesting. Given 
more time and experience we would have liked to incorporate proxy firms in our 
analysis as we believe it could help to shed even more light on the extreme corporate 
financial policy of zero outstanding debt. We would also have liked to have included 
market values and share repurchases in our study, and if available we believe such 
data can provide further empirical evidence, and possibly explanations, into the zero 
leverage mystery. Although a daunting task, we believe cross-national studies 
examining the zero leverage phenomenon could be very insightful and add to the 
small, but growing, literature of such an interesting field within corporate finance.  
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Appendix 1 
Definition of variables 
The table describes the definitions of the variables considered in the thesis. The data 
set is made available by SNF (Institute for Research in Economics and Business 
Administration) and NHH (Norwegian School of Economics) through Aksel Mjøs 
and Karoline Øksnes. After our adjustments it c onsists of 345,363 firm-year 
observations from the period 1993-2010.    
  
 
Variables  Definition 
Book leverage Interest bearing debt to total assets 
CPI Annual consumer price index from SSB (Statistisk Sentralbyrå (2013)) 
Log (Size) Natural logarithm of total assets in 1998 Norwegian Kroner 
Size abs Total assets in 1998 Norwegian Kroner  
Age The difference between the observation year and the firm’s registration year 
Profitability Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) to total assets 
Cash Cash holdings to total assets 
Dividend Dividends to total assets 
R&D Research and Development to total revenue 
CEO comp CEO compensation to total revenue 
CEO comp abs CEO compensation in 1998 Norwegian Kroner 
Rating D&B’s credit rating (C=1, B=2, A=3, AA=4, AAA=5) 
Tax Taxes paid to total assets 
Tangibility Fixed assets (PPE) to total assets  
Initial ZL  Dummy variable: 1 if initial interest bearing debt is zero and 0 otherwise 
Ind. Frac. ZL Fraction of ZL firms within the same industry (industry defined in appendix 2) 
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Appendix 2 
Overview of industry classifications 
The table gives an overview of the NACE codes included in the 12 main industries we 
have used in our industry study. Note that we have excluded the following NACE 
codes in our dataset: 65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension 
funding; 66 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security; 75 
Public administration and defence & compulsory social security; 91 A ctivities of 
business, employers and professional organizations; 95 A ctivities of households as 
employers of domestic staff. Some observations have no NACE-classification in our 
data set. These observations have been removed in our industry study.  
 
  
 
NACE codes: 
Industry No. of obs.   From To 
Primary industry 12,144 
 
- 10,000 
Oil/gas 1,588 
 
11,000 12,000 
Manufacturing 54,606 
 
10,000 11,000 
  
 
12,000 40,000 
Construction/Energy 35,691 
 
40,000 50,000 
Commerce 106,082 
 
50,000 60,000 
Shipping 9,241 
 
60,300 60,400 
  
 
61,100 61,200 
Transport/Travel  15,818 
 
60,000 60,300 
   60,400 61,100 
   61,200 64,200 
Financial services 899 
 
65,000 70,000 
Services/advisory/real estate  78,808 
 
70,000 71,330 
   71,340 72,000 
   73,000 75,000 
  
 
90,000 91,000 
Healthcare 7,635 
 
85,000 90,000 
Culture/Media 5,158 
 
92,000 95,000 
IT/Telecom 8,161 
 
30,020 31,000 
  
 
64,200 65,000 
  
 
71,330 71,340 
  
 
72,000 73,000 
Total 335,831     
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Appendix 3 
Industry breakdown - public companies and consolidated groups 
The table reports the distribution of ZL and AZL firms in addition to the average book leverage (BL) and the average firm size (in mNOK) of 
each industry for both Private companies and Private Groups.  
 
  Private companies    Private Groups 
Industry BL Size ZL AZL N   BL Size ZL AZL N 
Primary industry 0. 49 56 9. 2 12. 9 12,123 
 
0. 45 220 3. 2 6. 0 1,459 
Manufacturing 0. 32 102 13. 5 20. 4 54,036 
 
0. 34 392 5. 7 12. 7 8,135 
Oil/gas 0. 37 3162 17. 7 26. 4 1,441 
 
0. 32 6487 13. 9 26. 1 230 
Construction/energy 0. 21 146 22. 6 33. 2 35,620 
 
0. 28 1406 7. 1 17. 7 3,469 
Commerce 0. 29 44 20. 4 27. 3 105,917 
 
0. 33 235 7. 9 15. 9 12,864 
Transport/Travel 0. 35 102 18. 0 24. 2 15,785 
 
0. 37 453 8. 4 17. 0 2,376 
Shipping 0. 53 459 11. 1 14. 7 8,934 
 
0. 47 1325 5. 0 9. 2 2,251 
Financial services 0. 15 1224 45. 9 60. 4 882 
 
0. 19 1221 33. 5 46. 8 248 
Services/advisory/real estate 0. 40 138 19. 2 25. 4 78,374 
 
0. 39 337 8. 0 14. 9 24,575 
Healthcare 0. 34 94 22. 9 28. 2 7,635 
 
0. 35 266 7. 0 14. 8 670 
Culture/Media 0. 33 59 25. 5 33. 0 5,138 
 
0. 37 238 14. 9 20. 5 697 
IT/Telecom 0. 21 176 39. 0 49. 2 7,924 
 
0. 19 350 26. 3 42. 3 1,428 
All     19. 1 26. 1 333,809       8. 0 15. 5 58,402 
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Appendix 4 
Results from Zero-leverage event study 
The table shows the average ratio evolution around the first year a firm becomes zero 
leveraged (event year 0), 1993-2010. All variables except “Book assets” are described in 
Appendix 1. “Book assets” are described in section 5.5.  
 
Event year Book assets Profitability 
Book 
leverage Cash Tangibility N 
-7 1.466 0.141 0.340 0.161 0.295 1,843 
-6 1.453 0.147 0.319 0.175 0.275 2,468 
-5 1.424 0.149 0.311 0.177 0.269 3,057 
-4 1.370 0.151 0.294 0.184 0.256 3,838 
-3 1.305 0.160 0.266 0.195 0.242 4,638 
-2 1.304 0.164 0.237 0.211 0.225 5,756 
-1 1.267 0.175 0.190 0.228 0.198 7,346 
0 1.000 0.258 -0.001 0.335 0.119 22,807 
1 1.204 0.188 0.057 0.315 0.138 13,828 
2 1.384 0.175 0.078 0.304 0.144 11,495 
3 1.572 0.168 0.094 0.297 0.150 9,750 
4 1.747 0.160 0.107 0.288 0.154 8,152 
5 1.884 0.156 0.112 0.287 0.156 6,784 
6 2.004 0.158 0.122 0.280 0.154 5,487 
7 2.099 0.151 0.127 0.276 0.156 4,578 
8 2.189 0.152 0.131 0.280 0.157 3,822 
9 2.334 0.149 0.137 0.281 0.155 3,173 
10 2.433 0.153 0.131 0.278 0.154 2,519 
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Appendix 5 – Panel A 
Correlation matrix – Private companies 
The table reports the correlations between pairs of the variables considered in the thesis. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. All correlation 
coefficients are significant at the 1% significance level, except those marked with # 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Size 1         
(2) Cash -0.218 1        
(3) Age 0.175 -0.007 1       
(4) Profitability -0.116 0.218 -0.034 1      
(5) Tangibility 0.246 -0.348 0.038 -0.051 1     
(6) Initial ZL -0.155 0.367 -0.027 0.110 -0.270 1    
(7) R&D 0.023 -0.013 -0.012 -0.020 -0.010 -0.004# 1   
(8) CEO comp abs 0.043 0.013 0.014 -0.003# -0.029 0.008 0.001# 1  
(9) Ind. Frac. ZL -0.111 0.164 -0.011 0.027 -0.158 0.166 0.014 0.040# 1 
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Appendix 5 – Panel B 
Correlation matrix – Private consolidated groups 
The table reports the correlations between pairs of the variables considered in the thesis. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. All correlation 
coefficients are significant at the 1% significance level, except those marked with # 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Size 1 
        (2) Cash -0.1784 1 
       (3) Age 0.1845 -0.0174 1 
      (4) Profitability -0.075 0.122 -0.0131 1 
     (5) Tangibility 0.1485 -0.3449 0.0534 0.0001# 1 
    (6) Initial ZL -0.1021 0.2863 -0.025 0.0422 -0.1885 1 
   (7) R&D -0.0127# -0.0064# -0.0258 -0.0756 -0.0347 0.0027# 1 
  (8) CEO comp abs 0.3269 0.0075# 0.0526 -0.0271 -0.1033 0.0235 0.0052# 1 
 (9) Ind. Frac. ZL -0.0245 0.1276 -0.057 -0.0222 -0.1263 0.1422 0.0568 0.1282 1 
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Appendix 5 – Panel C 
Correlation matrix – Public companies 
The table reports the correlations between pairs of the variables considered in the thesis. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. All correlation 
coefficients are significant at the 1% significance level, except those marked with # 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Size 1 
        (2) Cash -0.3417 1 
       (3) Age 0.3472 -0.2138 1 
      (4) Profitability 0.2353 -0.0746 0.1096 1 
     (5) Tangibility 0.2891 -0.3203 0.1603 0.1497 1 
    (6) Initial ZL -0.2207 0.2797 -0.1652 -0.1129 -0.2289 1 
   (7) R&D -0.0663 0.0527# -0.0554# -0.0968 -0.0599# 0.0197# 1 
  (8) CEO comp abs 0.3653 -0.0234# -0.0259# 0.0173# -0.1178 -0.0093# -0.0369# 1 
 (9) Ind. Frac. ZL -0.241 0.3117 -0.2414 -0.0693 -0.298 0.2577 -0.0073# 0.1851 1 
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